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Introduction
The procedure for improving the quality and safety
of any product or service, both directly related to the
characteristics of the process through which the
product or service is generated, involves a series of
common, preliminary steps:
1. a description of the processes related to the life-
cycle of the product,
2. identification of all the elements involved in the
processes (informatics systems, procedures, human
resources, infrastructures) with the creation of a
detailed inventory of the materials and equipment,
3. the definition of measurable points of control for
every element; the controls must be based on
requisites identified a priori and on a mechanism
in which the controller and the controlled person
are not the same.
The information collected by quality management
systems and risk analysis techniques is combined in
order to determine the priorities for interventions
aimed at making improvements.
Risk analysis techniques
The management of risks in complex processes,
such as those present in most health care activities,
must be conducted in a multidisciplinary manner. The
main aim is to provide an efficacious service for
patients, recognising and managing both human errors
and system errors with the same level of detail as
"good healthcare practices".
The need to prevent human error has led to the
distinction of different types of faults: active errors,
which cause immediate consequences, and latent
errors, which are not manifested until the occurrence
of a triggering event.
The aim of prevention is to identify every critical
situation which could conceal a possible fault, active
or not. The crucial aspect is the problem of exposing
and managing latent errors, since it is particularly
difficult to evaluate the direct and combined effects
of such errors. The levels of safety for the patient must
be improved by creating "protections" in which
technology plays an important role and is connected
with the managerial and organisational systems.
Various different methodological instruments can
be used for the analysis of processes, depending on
the level of detail required. All these techniques are
aimed at an "early diagnosis" of possible faults,
without neglecting the final client's satisfaction. Both
qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches can be
employed, these being based, respectively, on the use
of purely descriptive terms or numerical indices
assigned according to more objective definitions.
The concept of quality assurance rather than
quality control is now widely accepted in quality
management systems; that is, the tendency to
guarantee a priori the quality of a product or a service,
rather than ascertaining the quality a posteriori on
the final output. In general, two broad approaches can
be used:
- reactive analyses, in which a process is studied
after an event, in order to identify all the causes
which led to the occurrence of the event,
- proactive analyses, in which a process is reviewed
with the aim of detecting critical points of the
system in order to remove or markedly reduce
them.
Simplified greatly, it can be said that a reactive
analysis is based on an a posteriori examination of
what has already happened in order to understand the
causes of the failure; the strategies most widely used
in this field are incident reporting, reviews, the
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techniques of "sign research" and root causes analysis.
On the other hand, the proactive approach, typical of
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and failure
mode, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA), is
based on a preventive study of the process with the
aim of eliminating critical elements of a system, before
an incident occurs.
Given the complexity and the wide variability of
their application, processes in a healthcare structure
are excellent candidates for the use of these methods.
The possibility of using an analytic instrument to
collect and manage all the elements necessary to reveal
the critical points as well as the capacity to define
synthetic and objective indicators that can be applied
to the process are fundamental factors when choosing
the most appropriate method.
From a rapid overview of existing literature, it can
be seen that, in the field of healthcare, these methods
are used predominantly to:
- assess the potential advantage of introducing new
processes, equipment, etc.;
- analyse processes in use, identifying their main
critical points, monitoring the effect of any
changes, whether minimal or substantial, and
evaluating their impact on the process
- compare, both retrospectively and prospectively, old
and new processes with various levels of criticity;
- guarantee the quality and safety of medical devices.
Clinical Risk Management and Quality Risk
management
The techniques for analysing risks are risk
management instruments, which represent the set of
complex actions put in act to guarantee the safety of
patients and healthcare staff and which constitute,
together with quality management systems (QMS)1,
one of the main applications of "clinical governance".
Clinical risk management initially emerged as a
response to financial aspects of healthcare related to
the growing number of medico-legal actions and
requests for compensation, but over the years is
becoming part of the structured, planned activities of
the system and of the interventions to improve the
quality of healthcare services. In fact, safety derives
from the capacity to plan and manage procedures able,
on the one hand, to limit the effects of errors that do
occur (protection) and, on the other hand, to reduce
the probability that such errors occur (prevention).
For a system to be effective and efficient there must
be full integration between risk management and
QMS, as experience from the industrial sector has
already demonstrated (see ICH Q9 Quality risk
management)2.
At the Transfusion Service of Meyer University
Hospital in Florence, we had carried out various non-
systematic risk analyses; subsequently, thanks to the
initiatives and opportunities made available through
collaboration with external companies (Pharma
Quality Europe - PQE) and institutional activities
(Prevention and Protection Service)3, we tested the
structured use of a proactive technique of risk analysis
(FMECA) in the real process of collecting, processing
and distributing haematopoietic stem cells from
related allogeneic donors in an attempt to identify risk
mitigation interventions that could be applied in this
context. We tried to analyse the risks in a systematic
manner, in part spurred by institutional 4,5 and
professional6 accreditation systems and by recent
legislation, which has given great emphasis to the
quality and safety of this process that is subject to
regulations relating to both transfusion matters and
tissue and cell banks5,7,8. The management of
equipment and medical devices9 as well as the
structure's informatics system have emerged from risk
evaluations as critical points of great importance.
Indeed, the informatics system has become of
particular relevance since the introduction of
Ministerial Decree 208/077. In paragraph (q) of article
1 of this decree, an "informatics system" is defined as
a "system that incorporates data entry, electronic
processing and the production of information to be
used for the purposes of notification, automatic control
and documentation". These systems, as indicated in
various parts of the decree and, in particular, in article
5 "…must undergo regular controls of their reliability,
be validated before use and be subjected to periodic
servicing to ensure that they continue to fulfil the
planned requisites."
FMEA/FMECA
From among the techniques mentioned above, we
decided to test the FMECA one in this study. We will
briefly describe the underlying principles of this
technique, starting from its basis, FMEA.
FMEA is a method for analysing a system; its
purpose is to identify possible modes of failures/errors,
their causes and their effects on the performance of
the system. It is a proactive method of analysis that
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closely follows the logical process used by a good
planner. Its application makes it possible to identify
and, therefore, mitigate, the risk of defects/errors in a
product or in a service, at the same time as providing a
reference against which to compare the real behaviour
of the product. This technique does, however, have the
intrinsic limitation of considering the types of failure
as independent, which means that chain effects of
different types of errors are not taken into account.
The term FMECA is used when the analysis is
extended to include the severity of the consequences
of a non-conformity. FMECA incorporates a system
for classifying the severity of the modes of failure,
with the aim of enabling priorities to be made when
planning any corrective measures to adopt. The
general considerations on FMEA that we make below
are, therefore, also valid for FMECA.
The decision to undertake a FMEA may be made
because of the need to identify failures capable of
causing unwanted effects on the system, to satisfy
specifications and requisites imposed by a "client"
(within or outside the system) or to improve the
reliability, safety and ease of maintenance of the
system itself. The aims of FMEA, therefore, include
the identification and classification of functional
failures of the system in relation to their relevant
characteristics (measurability, ease of identification,
actions that can be taken, etc.), an estimate of the
severity and probability of the failure, the development
of improvement plans to mitigate the types of faults
and, finally, the possibility of supporting the
development of maintenance projects designed to
attenuate or reduce the probability of failures.
The following steps are essential parts of the
FMEA methodology:
a) establish the fundamental underlying rules for the
FMEA and the schedule guaranteeing the
availability of skills and time necessary to start
the analysis;
b) carry out the FMEA using appropriate spreadsheets
or instruments, such as fault tree analysis, logical
diagrams, etc.;
c) produce quantitative results and reports that
include the conclusions and recommendations
triggered by the analysis;
d) maintain the FMEA updated.
According to the FMEA, the process/product/
service must be broken down into its elements,
defining, for each of these:
- its function;
- a description;
- the mode of failure, that is, the way in which the
product/process/service may not fulfil its function
and thus satisfy the requisites, needs, expectations
and requirements of the client (manifestation of
the failure or of the non-conformity);
- the mechanism of the failure, that is, the chemical,
physical or other process that gave rise to the
failure;
- the cause of the failure, that is, the circumstances
related to the project, to its realisation, to the use
of the product/service that generated the failure;
- the effects, defined as "local" when they have
repercussions on the element itself and "final"
when, on the other hand, the failure has an impact
at a higher level;
FMECA, applied in this study, has three additional
parameters:
1) O (Occurrence): the probability of the occurrence
of a non-conformity (intended in our case as the
combination of modes of failure and effects on a
patient, donor, or member of staff) in a
predetermined period of time;
2) S (Severity): the severity/criticalness of the failure;
3) D (Detectability): the difficulty in detecting a non-
conformity.
Each of these three non-dimensional parameters
is arbitrarily assigned a value from 1 to 10 and the
product of these three values provides a fourth index
known as the Risk Priority Number (RPN)
RPN = S x O x D
which must be as low as possible.
The value assigned to O is an increasing number
on the scale of integers from 1 to 10 (as done for the
S parameter), rather than the probability of the
occurrence in a period of time; this approach, which
is widely used in the literature, simplifies the whole
evaluation process considerably.
The 'Detectability' parameter, D, is an estimate of
the probability of identifying and eliminating a fault
before this has negative effects on one of the three
subjects considered (patient, donor, member of staff).
For ease of calculation, this index is assigned values
in an inverse order with respect to those used for S
and O: high values of D (again expressed as an integer
from 1 and 10) indicate greater difficulty in detection
and, therefore, less probability of identification, thus
contributing to increasing the final value of the RPN.
6The range of whole numbers between 1 and 10
was chosen to maintain a certain conformity with the
fields of application in which the use of FMECA has
been consolidated for some time, such as analyses in
the car industry of planning processes (DFMEA –
design failure mode and effects analysis) and of
production processes (PFMEA – production failure
mode and effects analysis). In order to lower this
index, project modifications are introduced to reduce
the value of at least one of the indicators (the Severity
is difficult to reduce). These strategies are known as
design reviews (corrective actions).
The RPN can be useful for defining the scale of
priorities for mitigation interventions to adopt for the
various types of failure. However, as will be clarified
later, the RPN must always be evaluated together with
the three values that generate it. For example, for the
same RPN, it would be wise to give precedence to
resolving those modes of failure for which the severity
values, S, are highest.
The choice of method to use to select items for risk
reduction interventions is subjective and depends strictly
on the type of application. According to the aim,
intervention thresholds can be set based on the RPN
(often corrective measures are taken for the items with
the highest RPN in each phase, then the FMEA is updated
and the procedure repeated), or on other parameters
(typically the Severity factor, S) ignoring the RPN10-12.
Application of FMECA to the process of
collecting, manipulating and distributing
haematopoietic stem cells in the Transfusion
Service of Meyer University Hospital
In this context the risk mitigation strategies should
be developed to protect the product, the patient and
the staff, without undervaluing the risks related to non-
conformities with current legislation. The first task to
perform with the purpose of managing risks is to
identify them. In a first analysis, the risks can be
grouped into the following general categories:
1. Adverse effects in the patient prior to
transplantation
2. Adverse effects in the donor
3. Adverse effects in members of staff
4. Loss of product
5. "Insufficient" product
6. Contaminated product
7. Non-conformity with legislation.
These risks can, for example, be caused or fostered
by the use of "open processes", the use of complex
instruments (e.g. apheresis equipment,
immunomagnetic separators, freezing systems,
cyrocontainers), the lack of standardised quality
control tests, the use of potentially infective material,
and the clinical status of the recipient.
The FMECA was planned by the head of the
Transfusion Service's QMS and lecturers at the
Department of Electronics and Telecommunication at
the University of Florence, who also compiled the
tables and subsequent processed the information. The
occasion was taken to review the description of the
processes carried out in the Service, in order to a have
a complete, updated overview of the micro- and
macro-activities, staff, equipment and informatics
systems (software/hardware – SW/HW) involved. The
collaboration of Pharma Quality Europe (PQE) was
useful in the evaluation of the SW/HW systems, which
were given particular attention. The head of the
hospital's Protection and Prevention Service
contributed to evaluating the risks to staff. Besides
the professional experience of the staff, the data
recorded by the structure's QMS (non-conformities,
adverse events in patients and donors, etc.) were of
help in evaluating the probabilities of certain
occurrences. Indeed, one of the greatest difficulties
was evaluating these probabilities, particularly for
events that are so rare that they have never occurred
in the Service and for which the scientific literature
does not provide useful data.
The level of detail to use must be established in
order that each phase can, in its turn, be analysed in
more depth, by breaking it down yet further.
The critical points and description of the
process of collecting, processing and
distributing haematopoietic stem cells
Given its characteristics (treatment of "non-
repeatable" products, type of diseases treated,
involvement of healthy donors, use of complex
equipment, etc.) the process under study is recognised
as having numerous critical points that can be
examined from two points of view: that of the people
involved (donors, recipients and members of staff)13,14
and that of the process.
"Flow charts" representing the whole process of
collecting, manipulating and distributing
haematopoietic stem cells were used to highlight all
the relative critical points which could be identified
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7either theoretically, according to the literature, or
through the professional experience of the staff15-27.
The overall process was divided into six macrophases,
each identified by a number indicating its
chronological position:
1. Selection and suitability of the donor
2. Stem cell mobilisation
3. Collection
4. Manipulation and validation
5. Freezing and cryopreservation
6. Thawing and distribution
For each of these macrophases, a table divided into
four parts was used (Figure 1).
The tables consisted of a:
1) Schematic description of the activity, including:
(a) a list of the phases, (b) staff, (c) equipment, (d)
software, (e) documents, (f) materials, and (g)
premises.
Each entry is repeated for each type of fault, in
order to enable its unique identification.
2) Description of the failure and its relative effects
on patients, donors and staff
3) Quantitative evaluation of the failure
4) Any corrective or preventive actions taken.
The mechanisms and causes of faults were not
recorded, nor were the mild side effects inextricably
related to the process (e.g. headache or bone pain
during stem cell mobilisation); furthermore, a choice
was made not to describe and consider phases of the
transplant programme managed by others or not
directly interfaced with the structure.
The choice of combining an analysis of the process
with an evaluation of the effects of the modes of failure
was found to be useful for a better identification and
classification of the risks. In fact, the attribution of O,
S and D values can differ substantially depending on
the consequences for patients, donors and members
of staff. For this reason, the process breakdown
structure (PBS) codes reported in the tables, identified
by progressive numbers, take into account the different
effects on the people involved in the process. The PBS,
in analogy to work breakdown structure (WBS)
techniques used in the field of project management,
is structured hierarchically in three levels whose
numerical values identify, respectively, macrophases,
phases and types of faults with their effects.
Criteria for attributing the O, S and D values
One of the major limitations of the technique is
the lack of standardised scales of values for the O, S
and D parameters and the consequent difficulty in
identifying criteria with which to assign the scores in
such a way as to reduce the subjective component
related to direct, personal experience.
The Occurrence and Detectability scores were
divided into three classes (low, medium, high),
whereas for the Severity score, the values between 6
and 10 were left independent as representative of well
identifiable and particularly severe (sometimes
catastrophic) adverse events. Indeed, the most severe
adverse events were used as the end of the scale for
the S values, attributing maximum values8,9,13 to the
most severe events conceivable, for example, the death
of a healthy donor, distribution of an unsuitable
product, loss of the product.
Those factors with consequences on subsequent
phases were considered worsening factors of the
Severity parameter (see tables I, II, III).
Methodology and results of the data analysis
The data were analysed, independently for each
of the six macrophases identified, as follows: the
various items of the PBS – which represent, as said,
the possible combinations between subphases, types
of faults and effects on patients, donors, and staff –
were re-ordered by decreasing RPN in order to
highlight the points with the highest priority for
intervention.
During this operation, all the items with a RPN=0
were excluded since they did not represent any type
of failure. This first operation led to a list of items
without any chronological consequences, although
these could easily be identified since the above-
described PBS code had been adopted.
The mean RPN,  represented in the graph by a
dashed horizontal line, was then calculated for each
macrophase. The mean RPN is useful for both an
analysis of the distribution of the priority of
interventions within the lifecycle of the whole process
and because possible threshold levels for risk
mitigation interventions can be related to it.
The results of the FMECA analysis carried out are
summarised in tables IV, V and VI.
The analysis of the mean RPN and standard
deviation for each of the single macrophases shows
that these values remain similar to those calculated
for the whole "population", that is, all the individual
phases of the whole process (Table IV).
Risk analysis related to managment of peripheral blood stem cells
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4.01.01 
Transport of bags (plasma 
and HPC) from clinic 
Nurse, LT     
Clinic-
Lab 
Fall by member 
of staff 
  Injury 1 6 1 6 
Staff training/review of 
procedures 
4.02.01 
Control of laminar flow 
hood before use 
LT Hood    Lab 
Malfunction/ 
incorrect use 
Reinfusion of 
non-sterile cells 
 Contamination 3 9 5 135 
Ordinary/preventive 
maintenance 
4.03.01 
Obtaining bags from the 
clinic 
LT     Lab 
Slow 
communication 
between clinic 
and lab. 
  
Organisational 
inconvenience 
5 2 1 10 
Staff training/review of 
procedures  
4.03.02 
Obtaining bags from the 
clinic  
LT     Lab Lack of staff   
Organisational 
inconvenience  
2 4 1 8 Budget negotiations 
4.03.03 
Obtaining bags from the 
clinic  
LT     Lab 
Presence of 
untrained staff 
Reinfusion of 
incorrectly 
processed 
product 
 
Legal 
consequences 
2 3 4 24 
Staff training/review of 
procedures  
4.04.01 
Control of the requisites for 
conformity: conforming 
bags 
LT     Lab 
Acquisition of 
invalid bag 
Product with 
unsuitable 
characteristics  
 
Legal 
consequences  
1 9 4 36 
Staff training/review of 
procedures  
4.05.01 
Control of the requisites for 
conformity: non-
conforming bags  
LT     Lab 
Non-conforming 
bag 
Loss of cells 
Need to 
repeat 
apheresis 
Organisational 
inconvenience  
2 8 1 16 
Staff training/review of 
procedures  
4.06.01 
Notification of non-
conformity to the ward 
LT     Lab 
TUD not 
available 
  
Organisational 
inconvenience  
1 5 1 5  
4.07.01 
Registration of donor’s 
data in the freezing form 
BCUD  Excel 
R751 Freezing 
form, PBSC 
 Clinic 
Erroneous 
registration 
Loss of data 
Loss of 
data 
No guarantee of 
traceability 
4 5 3 60 
Staff training/ SW/HW 
validation 
4.08.01 Refrigeration of plasma LT Refrigerator    Lab 
Malfunction of 
refrigeration 
and discarded 
plasma 
Reinfusion of 
cells preserved 
in a 
replacement 
solution and 
not in plasma 
 
More work than 
planned 
2 4 4 32 
Ordinary/preventive 
maintenance  
4.09.01 
Determination of the 
volume of the collection 
LT 
Weighing 
scales 
   Lab 
Error in 
weighing and 
determining the 
volume 
Product with 
unsuitable 
characteristics 
 
Legal 
consequences  
2 8 4 64 
Ordinary/preventive 
maintenance  
4.10.01 
Sampling for quality control 
of the product 
LT Hood   
Test-tubes, 
labels 
Lab 
Insufficient 
sample 
  
Need to repeat 
sampling 
2 5 4 40 Staff training 
4.10.02 
Sampling for quality control 
of the product  
LT Hood   
Test-tubes, 
labels 
Lab 
Non-
homogenous 
sample 
Incorrect 
evaluation 
  2 7 5 70 Staff training 
 
LT, laboratory technician; BCUD, blood collection unit doctor; PBSC, peripheral blood stem cells; TUD, transplant unit doctor 
4 – Manipulation and validation 
PBS Phase Staff Equipment Software Documents Materials 
Premi
ses 
Effects on: 
Type of fault 
Patient Donor Staff 
Probability 
(O) 
Severity 
(S) 
Detectability 
(D) 
Score:  
1-10 
Score:  
1-10 
Score:  
1-10 
RPN Corrective/preventive actions 
Figure 1 –   As an example, part of the table used to analyse macrophase 4 – Manipulation and validation
9Table I –  Criteria for attributing the score for the Severity parameter
Score Class Description (examples)
1-3 Mild Repetition of the organisational inconvenience/activity causing loss of efficiency/efficacy
4-5 Moderate Medico-legal problems/loss of information/interruption of the process
6 Severe Distribution of a quantitatively insufficient product
7 Loss of the product (breakage, tampering)
8 Distribution of a qualitatively inadequate product (contaminated)
9 Distribution of an unsuitable product, in that it is destined for another recipient
10 Adverse events in healthy donor/staff member leading to irreversible lesions up to death
Table II – Criteria for attributing the score for the Occurrence parameter
Score Class Description (examples)
1-3 Low Event that has never occurred and/or is rarely reported in the literature or in benchmarking analyses
4-6 Medium Event that has occurred occasionally since starting the activity
7-10 High Event that has occurred many times since starting the activity
Table  III – Criteria for attributing the score for the Detectability parameter.
Score Class Description (examples)
1-3 High Event detectable during the performance of the activity
4-6 Medium Event not detectable during the performance of the activity, but for which there are reliable
instruments for detection in the subsequent phase
7-10 Low Event not detectable or detectable only at the end of the process
Table IV – Summary of the mean, mode, median, range and standard deviati on of the RPN values for each
macrophase and for the whole process
RPN Mean Mode Median Range Standard Deviation
Macrophases
1. Donor selection and suitability 62.55 70 70 120-10 29.72
2. Stem Cell mobilisation 51.86 63 56 90-15 22.21
3. Collection 57.50 72 56 120-10 28.16
4. Manipulation and validation 47.61 40 40 135-5 28.14
5. Freezing and cryopreservation 61.06 126 52 126-8 39.57
6. Thawing and distribution 49.46 72 48 108-6 24.45
Overall value 55.49 48 54 135-5 30.05
Risk analysis related to managment of peripheral blood stem cells
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These findings, although far from representing a
particular statistical result, do support the choice to
apply risk mitigation interventions by analysing the
individual macrophases separately and then repeating
the procedure on the whole "population".
Selection and suitability of the donor
The risks requiring particular attention in this
macrophase are those related to carrying out the
medical visit, the correctness of the donors' records,
the release of informed consent and the management
of examinations of suitability for donation. The first
two points are particularly important in the
management of foreign donors: the inability to find a
The phases taken into particular consideration were
those with an RPN of 100 or more and those with a
Severity score greater than 8, subdivided by
macrophase (Table V). The results are discussed below
phase by phase.
Table V – List of items with an RPN greater than 100, in decreasing or der. S scores of 8 or above are shown in grey
PBS Phase O S D RPN
4.02.01 Control of the level of contamination prior to entry 3 9 5 135
5.03.01 Validation of the bag 2 9 7 126
5.23.03 Definitive storage in liquid nitrogen (liquid or vapour phase) 2 9 7 126
5.25.02 Evaluation of the report on the sterility controls 2 9 7 126
5.15.01 Labelling of daughter bags 2 9 7 126
5.15.03 Labelling of daughter bags 2 9 7 126
1.05.02 Information to the donor and release of informed consent 5 6 4 120
3.03.01 Performance of the medical visit 3 8 5 120
5.06.01 Entry of data into the SW form/number of aliquots/calculation of volume 4 6 5 120
5.06.02 Entry of data into the SW form/number of aliquots/calculation of volume 3 8 5 120
3.26.01 Post-donation information 4 7 4 112
5.05.01 Registration of donor’s and patient’s data on the freezing form 4 7 4 112
5.19.01 Freezing at -80°C 2 8 7 112
5.15.02 Labelling of daughter bags 2 8 7 112
5.15.04 Labelling of daughter bags 2 8 7 112
5.23.02 Definitive storage in liquid nitrogen (liquid or vapour phase) 2 8 7 112
3.06.01 Labelling of bags 3 9 4 108
3.11.04 Cleaning and disinfection of the skin - venipuncture – connecti on to the cell separator 3 9 4 108
3.25.05 Blood sampling and sending test-tubes for analysis 3 9 4 108
6.06.01 Verification of the correct storage of the bags 3 9 4 108
3.07.01 Evaluation of venous accesses: unsuitable accesses 6 6 3 108
1.06.01 Performance of the medical visit 3 7 5 105
1.10.05 Blood sampling and sending test-tubes for tests of suitability 3 7 5 105
1.10.07 Blood sampling and sending test-tubes for tests of suitability 3 7 5 105
1.14.01 Updating of the donor’s healthcare records 4 5 5 100
cultural mediator and/or information documents not
translated into the potential donor's language can lead
to a delay or even lack of harvesting of haematopoietic
progenitor cells for transplantation; a donor can be
induced to undergo procedures at risk during the stem
cell mobilisation with severe clinical complications
(e.g. rupture of the spleen) and legal consequences
for the donor and staff, respectively. The RPN analysis
Bambi F et al.
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contamination can lead to the collection of a
contaminated product and, therefore, of a risk of
infection for the patient, with legal consequences for
the staff. Incorrect performance of the procedure can
lead to severe adverse effects in the donor (e.g.
convulsions, hypovolaemic shock, gas emboli). The
phase of removing the product is also critical in that
it involves risks related to the seal of the connecting
tubes and to the removal of the bag.
Manipulation and validation
The most critical point of the whole process (with
an RPN of 135) occurs in this macrophase: the control
of contamination (of the laminar flow hood and
premises) before their use. In the case of malfunction
or inappropriate use, not only can non-sterile cells be
reinfused, but staff may also become contaminated.
Another delicate step is the determination of the
volume of the collection, because an error in weighing
and in calculating the volume can lead to an erroneous
evaluation of the product and to the product being
processed using the wrong parameters. Centrifugation
to reduce the volume, during which the bag can break
with consequent loss of the product, is another critical
point. Finally, the step of verifying the conformity of
the bags should not be overlooked, given that the
acceptance of unsuitable bags could prejudice the
outcome of the manipulation process.
Freezing and cryopreservation
The control of contamination (of the laminar flow
hood and premises) is a critical step also in this
macrophase, being important in various phases, such
as the fractioning of the collection bag into aliquots
to freeze and the addition of the cryopreservation
solution.
The donors' and patients' data are recorded on the
freezing form through the use of a calculation
spreadsheet which, if set out poorly (overwriting of
data, wrong formulae, lack of protection) can lead to
a product with unsuitable characteristics, with possible
legal consequences for the staff. The number of
aliquots and their volumes are also calculated using
an electronic spreadsheet: in this case a damaged
datasheet or underestimate or overestimate of the
number of CD34+ cells can lead to an error in the
subdivision of the cells collected; in particular, an
overestimate of the number of cells in the sample will
lead to the final product being insufficient and the
also confirmed the importance of both a careful
medical assessment, in that a less than meticulous
evaluation can lead to the acceptance of an unsuitable
donor, again with possible clinical consequences (for
the donor) and legal implications (for the staff), and
of the correct compilation of clinical records, since
incomplete records imply a lack of registration of
relevant clinical information and will have severe legal
consequences for the staff.
During the phase of blood collection and sending
samples for controls of suitability, errors in labelling
or malfunction of the SW/HW systems involved can
lead to an incorrect evaluation of the donor making it
necessary to repeat the investigations (with possible
legal consequences and/or organisational
inconvenience for the staff). The validation of SW/
HW systems could limit the frequency and
consequences of their malfunction.
Stem Cell Mobilisation
There were no RPN of 100 or more for this
macrophase, because although severe adverse effects,
death and delayed onset severe adverse events in the
donor have very high S values, the RPN values are
medium or medium-high given that the probability
of occurrence of such events is very low. The only
point to highlight is the risk connected to errors in
evaluation of the conformity of the drug used in the
mobilisation.
Collection
The problems related to providing foreign donors
with correct information recur in this macrophase. The
aim is to prevent donors from carrying out potentially
harmful activities after the stem cell collection.
Likewise, risks associated with careless medical
assessments (acceptance of an unsuitable donor, with
possible clinical consequences for the donor and legal
implications for the staff) must be avoided. In this
macrophase, faults in labelling blood samples or a
malfunction of SW/HW can cause errors in the critical
phase of validation, with effects ranging from the need
to repeat the investigations of the donor to the far more
serious erroneous validation of the product, while a
fault in labelling the bags can lead to the re-infusion
of a wrong bag or contribute to the disposal of the
unit.
Another delicate problem is the management of
invasively obtained vascular accesses, whose possible
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type of fault is, therefore, more serious, even for the
same RPN.
As far as concerns the management of the bags,
an error in labelling can lead to the wrong bag being
infused or contribute to the disposal of the unit; during
the transport of the bags to the cryopreservation area,
a fall by the person carrying the units can lead to loss
of the product, particularly if the containers used are
not suitable, and to injury to the member of staff;
during the phase of freezing to -80°C, a malfunction
of the freezer can lead to a defective freezing process
(e.g. too slow) with consequent damage to the product;
finally, during the definitive storage in liquid nitrogen
(liquid or vapour phase) an error in the placement of
the bag can lead to the risk of it being lost. The
placement of a serologically positive unit (e.g. positive
for hepatitis B or C virus) in a liquid phase can lead
to contamination of the container and a risk for the
other units, while malfunctioning of the equipment
can expose staff to severe adverse events.
The validation of the product involves transfusion
managment software but, unlike the same phase for
the blood components, is not automated. There is a
risk of erroneous validation of products with
unsuitable characteristics.
The evaluation of the sterility of the sample is
important because if this is not carried out, there is a
risk of releasing uncontrolled products: if the product
is not sterile and cannot be replaced, there are risks
inherent in the management of a contaminated
transplant, while mistaken interpretation of results can
lead to the infusion of a contaminated product without
the possibility of taking the appropriate precautions.
Thawing and distribution
Before thawing the samples, the request itself must
be evaluated and the presence and correct storage of
the bags must be verified; furthermore, the bags stored
in liquid phase must be transferred to the vapour phase
before thawing. If the request is evaluated by untrained
staff, errors may occur in the subsequent phases; the
consequences of missing, incorrectly stored or
damaged bags are varied (delay or lack of transplant,
infusion of an unsuitable product, need for the donor
to undergo repeat apheresis), but all have obvious
clinical consequences for the recipient and legal
consequences for the staff. Breakage and/or
contamination of the bag during thawing or transport
to the ward can make it necessary to repeat the
apheresis or infuse a contaminated product. To avoid
infusion of a wrong bag, care must be taken during
the phases of identifying and assigning the bag,
printing the labels and making the delivery report,
which depend on the good function of the SW/HW
systems. The viability of the product and the residue
of the infusion must be controlled to determine their
efficacy. Finally, all the risks related to the use of liquid
nitrogen in the cryopreservation process (burns,
adhesion, inhalation, contact with the eyes, freezing,
death) must be taken into due consideration.
Conclusions
The first finding to report is the compression of
the scale of RPN values which occurs when applying
FMECA in this context: against a theoretical range of
RPN values from 0-1000, the actual range was
compressed to between 5 and 135. Since the RPN is
the product of the values for three factors parameters
(O, S and D), its increase is not linear and it is
particularly sensitive to non-parallel increases in the
three parameters. In fact, in our case the most severe
events (with high S values) were also usually the rarest
ones and the ones most easily detected (i.e. with low
O and D values). The mean values of O, S and D
(O
m
=2.86; D
m
= 3.21; S
m
=6.33) bear witness to this
tendency.
As can be deduced from the data presented in table
VII, the highest scores (5-10) were assigned more
frequently to the S parameter: this fact limits the
possibility of improvement, because the severity of
an event, even if it can be reduced by protective-type
interventions, is the most difficult parameter to control.
When deciding the priority of interventions, it is
clearly important to use a critical approach rather than
relying on a purely numerical method of selection:
for example, the most catastrophic types of faults
(S=10) do not appear in the list of PBS with the highest
RPN. Furthermore, the same type of fault can be
associated with different RPN depending on the effects
caused: an "error of labelling" during the activity
"blood sampling for analysis" in the mobilisation
phase (item 2.08.05) has a RPN score of 90, while
the same item at the end of the collection phase (item
03.25.05) reaches a RPN of 108. It can also occur
that an item with a lower RPN, for example, item
1.05.01 ("lack of request of informed consent from
the donor", RPN=63) but a higher S score (S=7)
warrants the same or greater attention than an item
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Blood Transfus 2009; 7: 3-17  DOI 10.2450/2008.0006-08
13
with a higher RPN, for example, item 1.14.02, (a
"malfunction of software" which prevents updating
of the donor's clinical records, RPN=75), but that has
a lower S score (S=5).
Organisational inconvenience and legal
consequences are among the most frequent effects for
staff members. The former occurs in part because of
the difficulties in managing a process included in the
complex pathway of haematopoietic transplantation
and, therefore, opportune interventions to improve
organisational aspects are essential features of risk
mitigation. The latter effects, also related to staff
errors, are explained by the criticality of the process
and the recent proliferation of overlapping regulations
which make conformity of the systems ever more
difficult. Although the FMECA technique was not
conceived to prevent intrinsic staff errors, it can help
to identify, as in our analysis, fundamental preventive
actions, such as staff training, and thus contribute
indirectly to the management of this type of error
(Figure 2).
Table V, which reports the items with a RPN above
Table VI – Means and respective ranges of the O, S and D values
Macrophases O: Mean Range S: Mean Range D: Mean Range
1. Donor selection and suitability 3.36 2-8 5.73 3-7 3.39 1-5
2. Stem Cell Mobilisation 3.00 1-5 6.14 4-10 3.24 1-9
3. Collection 3.19 2-6 6.33 3-9 2.88 1-*9
4. Manipulation and validation 2.45 1-5 5.66 2-9 3.39 1-5
5. Freezing and cryopreservation 2.50 1-4 6.98 3-10 2.58 1-7
6. Thawing and distribution 2.62 1-5 6.89 5-10 2.78 1-5
Overall score 2.86 1-8 6.33 2-10 3.21 1-9
Table VII – Relative frequencies of the scores attributed to the O, S an d D parameters,
calculated for the whole process. The highest frequencies for each score
are shown in grey
Score Relative frequency (%)
Occurrence (O) Severity (S) Detectability (D)
1 22.0 0.0 78.0
2 70.9 0.7 28.4
3 53.7 3.7 42.5
4 33.1 7.4 59.5
5 12.0 63.2 24.8
6 8.9 91.1 0.0
7 1.7 83.3 15.0
8 2.7 97.3 0.0
9 0.0 95.2 4.8
10 0.0 100.0 0.0
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100, highlights the importance of "traditional" critical
points in the process, such as controlling
contamination of the product, obtaining informed
consent from the donor and managing cryogenic
equipment, whose great importance could have been
hypothesised a priori.
However, the table also highlights the particular
attention that must be given to risks3 related to the
SW/HW systems which, also in this systematic
analysis, are shown to warrant a high priority. As
already emphasised, the introduction of automation
leads to more efficient, but not necessarily safer,
systems, because these are associated with new,
important critical points, whose treatment requires
sophisticated and expensive instruments. Although
there is less automation and integration of SW/HW
systems in the process of collecting and manipulating
haematopoietic stem cells than in the "standard"
transfusion process, the role of such integrated systems
is determinant and increasing in many critical
decisional steps. Indeed, the results of the FMECA
show that possible corrective actions for risk reduction
include the development of plans to test and validate
these systems (Figure 2).
The recent ministerial decree 208/077, which
makes this type of intervention unavoidable, does not,
however, report the immediately applicable models
or standards. In the absence of these, the only  possible
option seems to be to introduce, also into health care
processes, the instruments used to guarantee the safety
of SW/HW systems foreseen by pharmaceutical Good
Manufacturing Practice (GMP)28,29 according to the
fourth edition of Good Automated Manufacturing
Practice (GAMP4)30. The definition of "validation"
reported in the decree7, "the preparation of
documented and objective evidence demonstrating
that the predefined requisites of a procedure or of a
specific process can be systematically met", is the
same as that reported in the GMP since its earliest
versions (1987). The GAMP4 calls for the planning
of a "life-cycle" of an informatics system, which goes
from the initial version of the User Requirement
Specifications through to the phase of final validation
(Performance Qualification) according to a "V model"
(Figure 3).
The V model is based on the principle that
validation documentation must be integrated
synergistically with the planning documentation,
paralleling this latter's development, although always
giving due attention to the separation of the roles
between clients and provider, so that there is no
overlapping or conflicts of interests.
In summary, in sectors in which the safety of
people is at great risk (e.g. the aeronautic, nuclear,
pharmaceutical and health care industries) reactive
type risk analyses and mitigation techniques based
on adverse events and non-conformities are not
sufficient. What is needed is proactive instruments
that are able to provide the management system with
information useful for introducing appropriate
preventive actions and evaluating the priority of
interventions. It is clear that the QMS and risk
management information and instruments must be
integrated in order to function effectively and
efficiently. Many operations involved in both
approaches are the same or so similar as to  be able to
be carried out in a coordinated manner. The integrated
use of FMECA was found to be very useful in this
particular context.
The underlying concepts of FMEA/FMECA10 are,
in brief, the breakdown of the system with the
definition of the relative functional diagrams and the
indication of modes of failure and critical points. Some
considerations can be made regarding these elements,
which are the real contribution to the problem of risk
management in a process such as that under
evaluation:
a. The methodology can really be applied also to this
type of process, with the advantage of making the
various phases of the process "objective", thus
decreasing the probability of overlooking some of
them in the risk analysis.
b. The multidisciplinary team (staff who are expert
in health care, technical and organisational aspects)
is involved in every stage of the work, with the
advantage of providing a global perspective both
during the application of the method and
identification of the types of fault, and during the
analysis of the critical points and possible
solutions; this ensures less loss of time, given that
the various aspects of each problem are
immediately discussed by everyone, and, overall,
better results in terms of the efficacy of the
solutions proposed.
c. The methodology used does not provide solutions,
but focuses attention on problems. The breakdown
of the process highlights the possible faults of the
system, attributing them a semi-quantitative weight
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Figure 2 – The frequency of two of the main preventive/corrective actions (staff training and SW/HW validation) in
the various phases
Figure 3 – The life-cycle of the planning, realisation and validation of a SW/HW system
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and indicating the priorities for both more detailed
analysis and subsequent improvement plans, once
again demonstrating how the integration between
"quality systems" and risk management improves
the efficacy and efficiency of the management of
processes and rationalises the choice of the priority
of interventions.
d. There are situations in which critical points are
related to activities conducted externally (e.g. in
other laboratories) for which the lack of direct
control constitutes the main "weak" factor,
highlighting the need to broaden the evaluation of
suppliers.
e. FMECA, effective in relation to system errors due
to technical-organisational faults, is ineffective in
preventing intrinsic staff errors (e.g., a mistaken
clinical evaluation). It can, however, help to
identify, as in our analysis, fundamental preventive
actions, such as staff training, thus contributing
indirectly to the management of this type of fault.
FMECA, by facilitating the creation of an
integrated system between technical, health care
and organisational aspects, moves out of line or
eliminates some of the "holes" in the Swiss cheese
described by Reason31-33.
f. It is customary that the last step of the FMECA
procedure is a periodic update of the analysis to
"measure" the progress of the improvement plans.
This partially corrects one of the limitations of the
method, the way the various indices are assigned;
indeed, the repetition of the analysis reveals the
trend, making it less important to establish the
starting point exactly.
g. One of the assumptions of the technique, which
partially limits its field of action, is that of
considering the faults as independent (an all the
more critical aspect when considering processes
that involve both software and hardware). This
prevents a chain effect of different errors from
being taken into account. In these cases it is worth
supporting the FMECA with other analytic
instruments, such as fault tree analysis11,12.
h. The RPN index has some limitations that should
be taken into consideration, such as excessive
sensitivity to small changes in one of its three
constituent parameters when the other two
parameters have high values and vice versa. Thus,
although it is a useful, synthetic index, it must be
analysed in context with its three components O,
S and D. In some cases it could be worth modifying
the effects of the single parameters on the RPN
product by using factors of correction.
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